

" Sir Arthur Wellesley, in fact, privately protested against the Armistice, in the strongest terms; he distinctly declared his objections to the Commander-in-Chief, and tried all in his power to prevent him from granting the terms he did to the enemy. Sir Arthur Wellesley neither approved of, nor had any concern whatever in writing the Armistice. It was negotiated with Kellerman, by Sir Hew Dalrymple himself, and was afterwards signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley, in obedience to the positive order of Sir Hew Dalrymple."—MORNING POST (or Nabobs' Gazette), Sept. 22, 1808.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

COURT OF INQUIRY.—If there can be any such thing as unquestionable pre-eminence in absurdity, it is this thing, now going on at Chelsea. Flinging stones against the wind; eating hasty-pudding with an awl; drinking out of a bottomless pot; singing to the deaf; asking questions of the dumb; exhibiting pictures to the blind: all these, and every other thing that ever was seen, or heard of, yields to this matchless absurdity. A court, destitute of all legal form and authority; the members of which are under no obligation to perform or to abstain from performing any thing; destitute of the power to demand evidence or compel attendance; destitute of the power of putting any question upon oath, of enforcing obedience to any one of its commands, of issuing its censure, and even of pronouncing judgment, in any manner whatever, which, if hostile to the feelings of the party adjudged, would not, according to the present practice, subject it to a criminal prosecution for a libel. Is this the sort of Inquiry, of which the Rev. Edmund Poulter was speaking, when he came forward, at the Hampshire meeting, and, upon the express authority of Mr. Sturges Bourne, assured the people present, that an Inquiry, of the most satisfactory description was then actually instituted? Is this the sort of Inquiry, to which the king was advised to allude, and which the partizans of the ministry, asserted to have been promised, in the king's famous and never-to-be-forgotten Answer to the city of London? Is this the sort of Inquiry that will, or that *can*, satisfy the indignant nation? Be it remembered, that the king, in the answer which he was so ill-advised as to make to the city of London, referred them to *recent occurrences*, as a proof of his being, at all times, ready to institute Inquiries, in cases where the interests of the nation and the honour of his arms were concerned. What were those occurrences? Why, the trials of *Sir Robert Calder* and of *General Whitelocke*, though, I hope, the former will excuse me for naming them in

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the same sentence. But, observe, there was, in neither of those cases, a "*Court of Inquiry*." The former, though he had, with an inferior force, beat the enemy and taken two of their ships, was sent, like the latter, who, with a superior force, had been shamefully beaten; the former, like the latter, was sent, at once, to a court martial; a court invested with all the powers appertaining to criminal jurisdiction, not excepting that of sentencing the accused to suffer death. Well, then, these being the recent occurrences manifestly alluded to in the king's Answer, had we not a right to expect, that the men, now accused, would have been tried in a similar way? And can there be a doubt, in the mind of any man, what was the *real object*, which the ministers, or part of them at least, had in view, when they advised the king to give such an Answer, and to make, in that Answer, such an allusion?—The result of this court will be, the collection and publication of a mass of matter equal in bulk to that of the Old and New Testament; a mass that no man will ever have the patience to read; and a mass, which, I will venture to assert, will, in the minds of the nation, leave the question of guilt, or innocence, just where it now is. Of course, it will leave the complained-of grievance unredressed, and the people, in their different districts, will, if they be not bullied or corrupted into silence, renew their applications to the throne, or to the parliament, or to both, for a legal and rigid Inquiry.—In the meanwhile, the public should, it appears to me, seize upon, and treasure up, certain prominent facts that are transpiring at Chelsea, casting aside all that mass of detail, all that insignificant babble, all that miserable small-talk, dignified with the name of evidence, which can possibly be of no other earthly use, than that of bewildering and confusing their minds.—First then, it appears, supposing Sir Arthur Wellesley now to speak the truth, that all the numerous and positive assertions, made, as will be seen, in part, from my motto, in the Morning Post, and by the friends of Sir Arthur

Wellesley, respecting his PROTEST, were downright *lies*. All the stories, which came before the public (as relating to this Protest) in the shape of "*letters from officers of high rank and reputation in the army*;" all the numerous extracts of this sort; all the assertions about Sir Arthur Wellesley being forty miles distant from the scene of negotiation; all, all and every one of these assertions, are now, from Sir Arthur's, from the reported protestor's, own lips, proved to be *lies*.—Observe, as connected with this point, an assertion of Sir Hew Dalrymple; that a paper, from England, was actually circulated *in the army*, to the same, or nearly the same, purport with these now-acknowledged lies. Sir Arthur Wellesley denies having had any hand in the promulgation of either; but, as my correspondent, R. L. in a late number, very pertinently asks, why did not Sir Arthur, who "*came home on leave of absence*" so long before Sir Hew was "*recalled*;" why did not Sir Arthur, give a contradiction to these atrocious calumnies against his absent Commander-in-Chief, especially as the evident and necessary tendency of them was, to exculpate himself at the expence of that absent commander? No: it may be, that he had, himself, no hand in hatching, or in promulgating, those malignant lies; but, I may venture to leave any man of sound moral principles to judge, how far, under such circumstances, to *wink* at such lies makes him an accomplice with those, by whom they were hatched and promulgated. Had I been in the place of Sir Arthur Wellesley, I should, I hope, upon landing at Plymouth, and upon finding how things stood at home, instantly, before I got into my chaise; before I saw the face of the ministers; have taken care to send to the most rapid and most extensive channels of circulation, a declaration of my opinion, "that the Convention was a wise measure; but, that, at any rate, whatever degree of blame it merited, a full share of it was mine, I having assisted at the negotiation, the Commander-in-Chief having done nothing of importance without my advice and concurrence, and I, so far from protesting against the Armistice, having most heartily approved of it." It appears to me, that this is what I should have done. I think, I could not have slept an hour, 'till I had done this. It is certainly what honour, truth, and justice demanded; and it certainly is what was not done.—The next point worth particularly attending to is this: that, it now appears, from a document, produced by Sir Hew Dalrymple, that he, by the instruction of Lord Castlereagh, was to do no-

thing without consulting Sir Arthur Wellesley. More was meant than met the ear, in this case, and that Sir Hew would clearly perceive. What a man must be made of, to accept of a command on such conditions, I will leave the reader to say; but, the fact clearly enough is, that it was meant, that Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was the *seventh* in command; who had six senior officers over him, should, in reality be the Commander-in-Chief; that his should be all the praise that might become due; his all the renown; and, as far as saving appearances would permit, his all the reward, of every sort. Accordingly, it is said, and I have it from no bad authority, that the head of the high family is offended, that Sir Arthur is not created *Viscount Fimelra*! To this conduct, on the part of the ministers, and of Lord Castlereagh in particular; this creating of an unnatural sway, a confusion and conflict of authorities, where nominal rank was set in opposition to confidential trust; to this unwarrantable partiality; this poisonous influence at home, no small part of the indelible disgrace, and of all its consequent mischiefs, may, probably, be attributed; and, all other points apart, the having instructed a Commander-in-Chief to be, in fact, ruled by an inferior officer, being the seventh in command, is not only a fair, but necessary subject of parliamentary inquiry; for, one of two things must be: either the nominal Commander-in-Chief was, by the ministers, thought incapable of that post, or he was, without any necessity, insulted and disgraced from motives of favouritism towards another.—The next point, meriting the notice of the public, is, that it now appears, from the statement of Sir Hew Dalrymple, that the *whole* of the documents, relating to the disgraceful Convention, were transmitted to Lord Castlereagh in the French language. Men of spirit; men who had felt, as they ought to have felt, upon such an occasion; men, who had had a proper notion of what honour required, and who had had the wisdom to perceive the great effect, which, in certain cases, is produced by apparently trifling causes; such men would not, in the face, and under the very noses, of the Portuguese nation, have put their hands to any document in the French language, though, after acknowledging the legitimacy of the title of the "*Duc d'Abrantes*," and of the "*Emperor Napoleon I.*" this is hardly worth notice. So it was, however; the documents were not only drawn up, and signed, in the French language; but, in that language they were all sent home to Lord Castlereagh. Now,

then, and n what to ca signed lished langu were From me; there of su to do From unfair might were ments Now there ence the ot latic alone ley, v thing my c staten panie a few expre tude they mean favou this c rally before ferenc langu which subje their me th above the p opinio not u contin tende them of Co most of th the at who, nister positi positi negat day, l

then, let that Lord explain to an abused and most grossly insulted nation, how, for what reasons, from what motives, he came to cause the Armistice, *the only document signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley*, to be published to the people of England in the *French* language only, while all the other documents were published in the *English* language only. From the first, this was a great point with me; because, until this distinction appeared, there was no reason, that I could perceive, of suspecting the ministers of a disposition to do any thing that was wrong, or unfair. From this distinction, I did begin to suspect unfair intentions. Yet, until now, there might be a doubt; because, until now, we were not quite certain, *that all the documents came home in the same language*. Now we are certain as to that fact; and, there can be, I think, but very little difference of opinion as to the motive, whence all the other documents were translated for publication, while that one, that one which alone bore the name of Sir Arthur Wellesley, was published in French.—The next thing, towards which the public should, in my opinion, direct their attention, is the statement of Sir Hew Dalrymple, accompanied with documents to prove, that, *after a few days' consideration*, the Portuguese expressed their pleasure at, and their gratitude for, the Convention; though, at first, they had loudly condemned it; whence it is meant, that we should draw an inference favourable to that measure, which has, in this country, been so decidedly and so generally condemned. But, Sir Hew Dalrymple, before he prevails upon me to adopt this inference, must show me, that this change of language proceeded from some new lights, which the Portuguese had received upon the subject; he must let me see the *grounds* of their change of opinion; he must convince me that *their* reasoning was correct; and, above all things, he must convince me, that the persons, who had, at first, expressed opinions hostile to the Convention, were not under the smallest apprehension, that a continuation of that hostility might be attended with disagreeable consequences to themselves. I remember an English House of Commons, who, on one day, by an almost unanimous vote, did, upon a motion of the minister (Mr. Addington) decide in the affirmative relating to a certain tax; and who, when, *on the morrow*, the same minister, proposed to negative that same proposition, did, without any division, or opposition at all, give their vote in the said negative. We, who were not born yesterday, know too much of the means, by which

approving letters and addresses are sometimes, and particularly in cases of emergency, obtained, to lay much stress upon such documents; and, we know, that, in the present case, there existed, as to the *disapprobation*, no undue influence at all; and that the Portuguese, whether right or wrong in their opinions, had no temptation, when they *first* heard of the Convention, to say what they did not think.—We now come to the wonderfully *magnified numbers* of the French army. It has been stated, it appears, before the Court of Inquiry, that the number embarked amounted to *twenty-five thousand men*. It is not averred, that these were all *soldiers*; that they were all persons bearing arms, or capable of bearing arms; but, as the public must have observed, and with no small degree of surprize and indignation, all the generals, and others, who have been called upon to state their opinions as to the expediency of the Convention, have reasoned upon this fact, relating to numbers, as if all the persons embarked were actually so many capable of being brought into the field of battle. Now, if this were so, is it probable, that Junot would, in the first instance, have met Sir Arthur Wellesley with no greater a force than *fourteen thousand men*? Is this probable? And, then, when he actually negotiated, he had, if this new edition of numbers could be believed, more fighting men than our army consisted of, even after the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard. Nay, when Sir John Moore arrived, and he did not arrive till after the Armistice was signed, our whole army, even then, amounted to only *one-sixth* more than that of the “Duc d’Abrantes” is now made to amount to, he having all the fortresses and strong holds and positions, not only at his command, but in his possession. I appeal to the sense and judgment of the reader, whether Junot would have *dared* to make an offer of evacuation under such circumstances? So much as to the reason of the case; but, Sir Arthur Wellesley, in his dispatch, told us, that he defeated “the *WHOLE* of the French force, commanded by the Duke of Abrantes in person;” and, indeed, that the whole, or very nearly the whole, of the *effective* force was that day in the field, there can be very little doubt. It is barefaced hypocrisy to affect to believe, that Junot, who had so much time for preparation; who had the *choice of time* as well as of place; whom it so evidently behoved to have driven our first-advancing battalions into the sea; who had received a check on the

day before ; and who had all his means at his back and completely at his command : it is barefaced hypocrisy to affect to believe, that such a Commander, so situated, would march to the attack of superior numbers leaving *nearly half* of his efficient force in a state of inactivity. Besides, the reader will not fail to bear in mind, that, when the news of the Convention first reached England, it was asserted, by the friends of Sir Arthur Wellesley, that "if he had not been prevented from following up his victory of the 21st, the **WHOLE** French army *must inevitably have been destroyed*." Now, either this was a falsehood ; it was, from beginning to end, a *lie*, invented for the purpose of raising Sir Arthur Wellesley in the public estimation, at the expence of Sir Harry Burrard's reputation ; either this was a foul and malignant lie ; or, it is not true that Junot ever had, after the landing of any part of our army, twenty-five thousand effective men under his command. It is curious to observe, how this French army is raised, or lowered, as the purposes demand. They were nothing, when the purpose was to persuade the public, that Sir Harry Burrard was guilty of the crime of preventing Sir Arthur Wellesley from putting an end to them ; "*destroying* the whole of them," after the manner of Captain Bobadil ; but, now, when the purpose is to *defend* the Convention, it being no longer to be denied, that Sir Arthur Wellesley had a principal share in making that instrument ; now, the French army was very numerous, nearly twice as strong as the army with which Sir Arthur beat them. It is ; it is, say what they will, the old story of the Buckram Men revived. —The reader will see, that, at Chelsea, there is great stress laid upon the state of the army's provisions. Provisions, we are told, were not to be got on shore, in Portugal, and those, which we had on board, it was difficult to land. I have asked this question before, but I will ask again : how did the "Duc d'Abrantes ;" how did Wellesley's Tartar Duke ; how did *he* obtain provisions ? He had, they now tell us, twenty-five thousand men ; he had long had them there ; he had had no communication with the sea ; he had even the Russian fleet to feed, besides his own army. How did he, who had all the people for enemies ; how did he obtain his supplies of provisions, in this sad barren country, and not only enough for the time being, but enough to horde up stores for the long lingering siege, which our heroes apprehended ; I am in tribulation for an answer to this

question ; but, I have not yet heard it put by any of the great captains, now sitting in the *Court* at Chelsea. The truth is, that our generals appear to have eyes wonderfully adapted to the discovering of difficulties and obstructions. We have often been amused with descriptions of the miserable state of the French armies ; the shoe-less, hat-less, shirt-less state of the "wretched conscripts," "whom Napoleon leads to battle in chains." But, somehow or other, these wretches do fight and get on. They feed on the air, perhaps ; but, certain it is, that they live ; they find something to eat and to drink. Alas ! Buonaparte has generals, who can shift, for a while at least, without port wine and feather-beds ; and he has, of course, soldiers who follow their example. To hear the miserable excuses of a scarcity of provisions, want of horses and carriages, want of cannon, and the like, is truly deplorable, at a time when we have just been witnessing the campaigns in Austria, Moravia, and Poland ; campaigns, at one half of the battles of which, in the midst of winter, Frenchmen, bred up under a southern climate, fought up to their knees in ice and snow, at the end of a march, which had left them scarcely a shoe to their foot, and in which hardships the officers had shared with the men. If this is to be our manner of making war ; if to go into the field of battle, we must have our English luxuries, let us, in the name of common sense, give up the thing at once ; withdraw from the contest ; stay at home in ale-houses and barracks ; keep guard over the prisoners taken by the skill and valour of the navy ; and no longer expose ourselves to the scorn and derision of the world. —These are the points, which, as far as the proceedings have hitherto gone and been published, have chiefly attracted my attention. Out of the circumstances of Sir Arthur Wellesley's command, however, there arises a question or two, which are worthy of great attention. Whether this officer received the usual sum given to commanders of expeditions for their out-fit, together with the staff-pay and enormous allowance of a lieutenant general commanding in chief, including *bat* and *forage* money, which last alone would, I imagine, amount to, at least, five hundred pounds ? There is, too, it has been publicly stated, another general, employed upon the staff of the same army ; I mean the brother of Lord Castlereagh, who, along with the pay and emoluments of a major general, *bat* and *forage* money, &c. &c. receives pay, agreeably to the report laid before the House of Commons, as an *under secretary of state*,

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to the amount of *two thousand pounds a year*. Will the House of Commons make inquiry into these matters? Will they ascertain, whether Sir Arthur Wellesley, whether the man who signed the Convention of Cintra; whether this man was, at that time, and had been, for months before, receiving pay, at the rate of *six thousand pounds a year*, as chief secretary of state in Ireland? Will they inquire into these interesting matters? Are these things right? Will any sycophant, however base he may be, say that these things ought to be tolerated? To be "*loyal*" must a man hold his tongue upon matters of this sort? Is it to shew one's love of the country and of the constitution, to wink at these crying abuses? And, lastly, does the existence of such abuses tend to strengthen, or to overthrow, our excellent form of kingly government? — There is one general remark to add upon the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry; and that is this: that all the persons, hitherto examined, are, more or less, *parties concerned*. They should, consistently with reason, be called upon for nothing but official returns, or other documents; not, at least, in the present stage of the business. What are their *opinions* to us? They will hardly say, that they think they have done wrong. They will hardly give such evidence as is calculated to throw blame upon themselves. We are proceeding as if upon an implied acknowledgement, that an English *army* can never, in any possible case, do amiss. But, the fact is, that whole armies have frequently done amiss. Whole battalions, at least, have been disgraced, and, in some cases, have had their colours, and the facings of their coats, taken from them. I do not say, that the army in Portugal, or any corps of it, is under a shade; but, I do say, that we have nothing to do, in the way of evidence, with the *opinions* of any of the generals employed upon that service. It is impossible, that *such* an Inquiry can prove satisfactory to any man, who really wishes for satisfaction. There may be men, who will feign that they are satisfied, that all is well, though they hear of the "Duc d'Abrantes" having again taken possession of his Dukedom; but, the nation at large never will, and never can, and never ought to be satisfied, with any thing short of a fair, open, legal, and rigorous investigation into the causes, which have produced such disastrous effects. Parliament will, indeed, have full power to take the matter up; and, if all other modes of legal investigation are refused us by the ministers, we shall look to that with great anxiety. The mind of the nation never was more decidedly

made up as to any point whatever. It is impossible to shake it. The present proceedings have only strengthened the opinions already formed. There is no man, who looks with even the smallest degree of interest to the proceedings at Chelsea; and, if no other mode of Inquiry be instituted, fresh applications to the throne will certainly be made.

SPAIN. — There appears to be some reason to fear, that Napoleon is in but too fair a way of finally accomplishing his accursed purposes, with regard to the Spaniards. I was, but a few weeks ago, reproached by a correspondent for having, at first, expressed my fears, that the Spaniards would be subdued: I wish, with all my heart, that this ground of reproach, if it be one, may hold good to the end. I would much rather be regarded as a fool for the rest of my life, than that tyranny, in any shape, should, in a nation like Spain, triumph for a single day. — The Morning Chronicle has an article complaining of the conduct of the GENERAL JUNTA in Spain; and, though one does not like to begin to blame, at a moment when the blamed party appears to be experiencing a reverse of fortune, it must be acknowledged, that, as far as we can judge at this distance from the scene, and with means of information so imperfect, there is, as the Chronicle observes, but too much reason to look back with regret to the Junta of Seville. — The General Junta may be composed of wise and good men; but, it does not breathe the *spirit* of the Junta of Seville. It does, perhaps, contain more of *rank* than the Junta just named: but more rank and title will, I should think, do, in such circumstances, little, or nothing. — The General Junta appear to have directed their attention chiefly to the keeping of the people *quiet*; to the maintaining of "*order and tranquillity*;" to the repressing of all violences, proceeding from popular commotion. But, with their leave, this is not the way to oppose Buonaparte and his daring legions. The object of the Junta is, doubtless, to nip, in time, the bud of insurrection; lest, in, the end, the people, proceeding from one step to another, overturn the whole system of the government, in church as well as in state, as was the case in France. But, the question is, is Buonaparte to be resisted by any means other than those of a general insurrection; a general letting-loose of the people? I think, that he is not; and that the nobles of Spain have to choose, whether they will see king Joseph upon the throne, or see the people left to act as they please. There wanted, in

Spain, a renovation of character ; an entirely new spirit excited ; new talents called forth from obscurity. Therefore, if the nobles have assembled in a Junta, and are endeavouring to keep the people quiet ; to preserve "order and tranquillity," they, in my view of the matter, are taking precisely the wrong course. It is, in that case, little more than the *old government*, administered by deputy, under which, it is my decided opinion, that, sooner or later, Spain must fall. It is not *cautiousness* that is now wanted in Spain. It is vigour ; it is activity ; it is great daring ; it is enthusiasm. Anger, resentment, revenge ; every feeling that leads to violence. These are wanted in Spain. With these Buonaparte may be resisted ; but, without them, it seems to me that he cannot.—There is one decree, or edict, of this General Junta, from which, if it be authentic, it is impossible not to forebode great evil. I mean that, whereby they attempt to put a stop to what they call "the *licentiousness of the press*." If the press assault only Buonaparte and his friends, it is evident that it cannot be too unshackled. Why attempt to check it, unless it be feared, that it will produce what is thought to be mischief, in Spain ? And, if, so soon, the Junta itself be afraid of the press, the reader will easily suppose, that much of a change is not in contemplation, a fact which, the moment it is discovered by the people, will admonish them not to be very lavish of their blood. I must confess, that this little circumstance, this decree, for which the Junta will be, I dare say, greatly applauded by many, has, in my mind, excited very serious fears for the Spanish cause ; because, if authentic, it argues a *distrust of the people*, and an opinion, on the part of the Junta, that the country is to be defended by the *old ordinary means* ; than which, I am convinced, the result will prove nothing in the world to be more erroneous.—As to the check, or the defeat, for such I fear it is, that General Blake has received, I think nothing at all of it. How many such defeats did the French experience, at the out-set of their revolutionary war ? They rose more powerful after each defeat. It is true, that there is some little difference between the *assailants* of the Spaniards and those of the revolutionary French. Yet, this I do not value, if the Spaniards have a spirit like that of the French ; if they are animated by motives like those by which the French were animated. I cannot help thinking, that it was very unwise in us to send an envoy to the king of Spain. This was, in fact, one way of pointing out to the people

of Spain the object, which *we* thought they should have in view, and for the effecting of which we would give our aid. I am afraid, that this tended to damp the rising spirit of the people. There are persons, I know, who, rather than see the French resisted by a *patriotic insurrection*, would see Joseph Buonaparte in safe possession of the throne. This is a fact, which has been all along evident enough, and which was, long ago, dwelt upon by me. But, such persons must be very unwise, very short-sighted ; for, in the end, all the evils, which they may apprehend from the success of a patriotic insurrection, must come, and come swifter too, through another channel.—As to *our armies*, in Spain, they really appear to be in a rather "unsatisfactory state," at present. They are, however, under experienced commanders ; and, let what will be their fate, they will have done their best to assist the cause. It is impossible, that either ministers or commanders can foresee every thing : something must be left to *luck* ; and, therefore, if the expedition should fail, under Generals MOORE and BAIRD, I should not, from the bare circumstance of failure, be disposed to blame the ministers.—In the two Morning Chronicles of Tuesday and Wednesday last, there appeared some very spirited and able articles upon the conduct of the ministers, with regard to the war in Spain and Portugal. They are well worth reading ; but, I do not agree with the writer, that it was so easy a matter to know precisely what ought to be done, at the time when the expeditions were first sent out. Let the ministers have all the blame that is their due, but no more. It is the fashion, because it accords so well with *party motives*, never to blame the commanders, but always to blame the ministers. This is not only unjust in itself, but it has a very mischievous tendency, as to the conduct of those commanders, who, be that conduct what it may, are sure to meet with, at least, an indirect defence, from one party or the other. It is not so in the French service, where the commander is looked to, and nobody but the commander. There is nobody found to accuse the war-minister of not sending him to the right point, or of not supplying him with horses or provisions. The fact is, we have nothing but the parade of military service. We have no really military notions ; for, if we had, we never should endure complaints against the ministry for having "exposed a general to *difficulties and danger*," the existence of which are always implied when men talk of war.—That *ten thousand* English troops

should, at a moment like this, be, as the *Morning Post* states, necessary to “*curb*” the *refractory* disposition of certain classes of the *Portuguese*,” is, indeed, matter for serious reflection; for, in the first place, the “*refractory*” must, if this necessity do really exist, be the most powerful part of the nation; otherwise, they might be “*curbed*” by the part, who are *not refractory*. Then, what is the mark of this refractoriness? Is it a disposition favourable to the French? Is it a spirit of hostility to the Prince Regent or the old government? Or is it a dislike to the English authority? One or the other of these, I think, it must be. If the latter, it is quite evident that to withdraw our troops and our authority is the only effectual way of removing the necessity of keeping troops locked up in Portugal; and, if either of the former, it would, I think, puzzle the *Morning Post* to assign any probable good that will arise from keeping them there. To cherish, or defend, a people *against their will*, is a most difficult as well as a most ungrateful task. It is a task, which, from the nature of things, can never be attended with success. —Is it not a strange thing, that, amongst all the numerous nations, who have been subdued and plundered by the French, there has never yet appeared one, that has demonstrated any great degree of anxiety for the return of their former rulers? Some few have fought a little to keep the French out; but, when once in, there is scarcely any people that have discovered any very strong wish to get them out again. Who would not have supposed, that the people of Portugal, for instance, would have been half mad with joy at their “*deliverance*?” Who would not have expected to see them vie with each other in eagerness to obtain a return of the ancient order of things? Who would have imagined it likely to be necessary for *us* to keep ten thousand men in the country, “*to curb the refractory disposition*” of certain classes of a people, just delivered from the grasp of the French, and restored to the rule of the representatives of their “*beloved sovereign*”? I should like to hear the sapient editor of the *Morning Post* explain this political phenomenon; for it is a matter of vast importance with all those who study the science of government.

AMERICAN STATES.—The election of the new President and Vice President, which has taken place before now, will, it is thought, terminate in favour of the Jefferson party, and in the election of Mr. Madison to the office of president. If so, the embargo will, probably, continue; but, the violations of it, the almost open defiance of

it; will not be less than they now are. We were told, that the Americans could starve the West India Islands. Those Islands were, perhaps, never much better supplied from America than they now are, and have been ever since the embargo was laid. The town of Halifax, in Nova Scotia, is become a grand depository for American produce, whence it is shipped to the West Indies. And, in fact, all that Mr. Jefferson and his bitter set have done, with a view of injuring England, has had no other effect than that of injuring his foolish constituents.

CORN AGAINST SUGAR.—The effect of the American Embargo puts one in mind of the alarm of the “*Barley-Growers*,” who are now selling at from 50 to 60 shillings a quarter that corn, which they were afraid would sink *below* 37 shillings a quarter; and who, upon seeing the ports in the Baltic and in America closed against us, were seized with a dread, that we should be starved in consequence of being able to convert into bread 300,000 quarters a year of that corn of our own growth, which we formerly employed in making spirituous liquors! I defy all the world, the readers of the *Morning Post* not excepted, to produce me an instance of folly equal to this. Mr. Wakefield denied me the privilege of judging upon such a subject, because I was not a practical farmer. Just as if it was necessary for a man to be a good hand at ploughing and sowing, in order to be certain that 300,000 quarters of bread corn would add to the food of the nation. It was a question of such plain common sense, that, to come to a right decision, there required neither experience nor reason. Barley must now be dear till next harvest; so that, at any rate, there is one year for the Barley-Growers, free of that mischief, which they really did, or affected to, anticipate.

*** A letter from LORD ANSON to the Freeholders of Staffordshire is inserted, because it is right that my readers, who have seen the letter of A. B. should see, that that nobleman had it not in his power to be present at the county meeting.

THE INCOME OF THE DUKE OF YORK I do not state this week, because my intention is to publish, along with it, the whole of the act of parliament, granting him the estate in Surrey, and which is too long to be inserted, except in a double number.

MAJOR HOGAN does not answer my request. I have a letter before me, saying, that, next week, “the publisher of Major Hogan’s Appeal will send me a letter upon

“ the subject of that Appeal, and particular-
 “ ly with respect to the BANK NOTES.” I
 dare say, that there will be no objection to
 the insertion of the intended letter; but,
 I cannot refrain from apprizing the writer,
 that I am rather surprized, that the *numbers*
 of the Bank Notes have not been publish-
 ed. As the Major expressed his anxious
 desire to *return* the notes, one would think
 that he must *still have them in his posses-
 sion*; and, the gentleman who suggested the
 question to me, assured me, that, if the
 numbers were advertised, the notes would
 be traced to the *late possessor*, with the
 greatest facility. What I should do, were
 I in the Major's place, is this. State pub-
 licly the numbers of the notes, and offer
 to give them up to whomsoever would *prove*
à proprietorship in them, than which, I am
 told, nothing is more easy. The fact is,
 that, if the Major does this, the public will
 believe his account, respecting the notes,
 to be *true*; if he does it not, they will,
 with very great reason, believe it to be a
 most *atrocious falsehood*.

Botley, December 2, 1808.

NEW EDITION OF THE STATE TRIALS.

*On Monday, the 2nd of January, 1809,
 will be published (to be completed in
 Thirty-six Monthly Parts, forming Twelve
 very large Volumes in Royal Octavo),
 Part the First, Price 10s. 6d. of*

COBBETT'S

COMPLETE COLLECTION OF

State Trials,

AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON,
 AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS,
 FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD DOWN TO
 THE PRESENT TIME.

In proceeding with the PARLIAMENTARY
 HISTORY, which it has been, and is, one
 of the principal objects of my life to lay
 complete before the public of the present
 day, and, in that state, to have the satisfac-
 tion of leaving it to posterity, I have, for
 some time past, perceived that there would
 still be wanting a Work like that above
 described. In putting to myself this ques-
 tion, “ How shall I go to work to secure
 “ the best chance of rendering a son capable
 “ of accomplishing great things; fit to
 “ have a share in guiding the minds of
 “ others; of weight sufficient to make him
 “ an object of respect with good, and of
 “ dread with bad public men?” In putting
 this question to myself, the answer my mind
 suggested was: “ Suffer not his time to be

“ wasted in learning sounds instead of sense;
 “ suffer not his body and mind to be debi-
 “ litated by continual confinement and
 “ continual controul and correction. Give
 “ him, God being your helper, a sound
 “ body and strong limbs; habituate him to
 “ bear fatigue, to move with confidence
 “ and rapidity in the dark; to fare and to
 “ sleep hard; and, above all other things in
 “ the world, to rise with the lark, thus
 “ making his year equal to eighteen months
 “ of his effeminate contemporaries. Next
 “ lead him into the paths of *knowledge*, not
 “ minding whether pedants call it *learning*,
 “ or not; and, when he arrives at the
 “ proper age for acquiring that sort of
 “ knowledge, make him acquainted with
 “ every thing material, as to public affairs,
 “ that has *really* occurred in his country
 “ from the earliest times to the present day.
 “ Open to him the book, not of speculation,
 “ but of unerring experience. That he may
 “ be able to judge of what is, as well
 “ as of what ought to be, show him, in
 “ detail, all the political causes and effects,
 “ to be found in our history; make him
 “ see clearly how this nation has come up,
 “ and how this government has grown to-
 “ gether.”

From these, or such like reflections, sprang
 that arduous undertaking, the PARLIAMEN-
 TARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND; and, from
 the same source arises the Work, which I
 now submit to the judgment of the public.
 As I proceeded with the HISTORY, I found,
 that to read discussions, relating to Trials for
 High Treason and for other high Crimes and
 Misdemeanors, and not to be able to refer
 immediately to those Trials, they being so
 intimately connected with the history of the
 parliament, and being a detailed relation of
 some of the most important and most inter-
 esting events to be recorded, could not fail
 to be greatly disadvantageous to the student:
 yet, to bring into the HISTORY such a mass
 of legal proceedings, which admitted of
 little abridgment, was, for several reasons,
 not to be thought of. I, therefore, resolved
 to form them into a separate Work, to be
 published during the same time, and in the
 same manner, as to paper and print, with
 the PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY.

Besides the consideration of uniformity,
 there were others which had great weight in
 this determination. The STATE TRIALS are
 now to be found only in an edition of *Eleven*
Volumes in folio, a form so unwieldy that it
 is impossible they should ever be much read,
 to say nothing of their incomplete state, or
 of the expence; which latter alone, owing
 to the scarceness of even this imperfect edi-

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tion, must be a serious obstacle to general circulation. So that this Work, though absolutely necessary to the lawyer and the professed politician, very curious, interesting and instructive, in *itself*, and, in a high degree, illustrative of the legal, political, and constitutional history of the country, is to be met with in but very few private libraries, those of counsellors and solicitors not excepted. The mere reduction of size, from the unmanageable folio of former editions to that of the Royal Octavo, double page, which unites economy with convenience, will, in itself, be no inconsiderable improvement. But, the proposed edition will possess the following additional advantages: 1. The Series will commence more than two hundred years before the time of the earliest transaction noticed in the former editions. 2. Many very important Trials and curious matters, omitted in the former editions, though occurring within the period which those Editions embrace, will be supplied; and the Series will be continued down to the present time. 3. Many useless repetitions, ceremonials, &c. will be omitted, but every Trial will be scrupulously preserved: 4. Many unmeaning and uninteresting pleadings will be omitted; yet, all those, which are either curious in themselves, or upon which any question arose, will be carefully retained: 5. The different articles, relative to each case, will be placed together, so that the trouble of frequent references backwards and forwards, attending a perusal of the former editions, will be avoided; and, where references from one part of the work to another necessarily occur, the paging of the present work will alone be regarded, so that the confusion arising from the various pagings of the former editions will, in no case, arise to tease and retard the reader: 6. The Trials, instead of being placed in the vexatious disorder of the former editions, will stand in one regular chronological succession, unless where a different arrangement shall be dictated by some special reason; as for instance, where more Trials than one concern the same party, or the same transaction; for, in such cases, it may sometimes be thought advisable to break through the order of time, for the sake of exhibiting together all the particulars relating to the same matter or the same person: 7. Brief historical notices of the conspicuous persons mentioned in the Work, or references to published accounts of them, will be occasionally inserted: 8. Where points of law arise, references will be made to those parts of the Law Digests, or Treatises on Criminal Law, in which the principles and cases,

relating to such points, are laid down, or collected: 9. In like manner, references will be made to my Parliamentary History for Parliamentary Proceedings connected with any Trial, and to other works calculated to elucidate any part of this Collection of Trials: 10. Some Trials before Courts Martial, but those only of the greatest importance and most general interest, and illustrative of the history of the times, will be preserved in this Work: 11. To each Volume there will be prefixed a full and clear Table of Contents, and in the last Volume there will be a General Index to the whole Work, so complete that I hope it will be found to leave nothing of any importance difficult to be referred to.

It is computed, that the Eleven Volumes of the last edition of the State Trials will be comprized in Nine Volumes of the New Edition, and that the Additional Matter to bring the Work down to the present time, will make three Volumes more. The whole Work, therefore, will consist of Twelve very large Volumes. The paper and print will be, in every respect, similar to those of the Parliamentary History. In the mode of publication only there will be this difference; that, while the History is published in *Volumes*, the Trials will be published in *Parts*, one Part coming out on the first day of every month, in the same manner as the Magazines and other monthly publications; and will, like those publications, be sold by all the Booksellers, Law-Stationers, and Newsmen in the kingdom. Three Parts will make a volume, and it will be optional with the Subscribers, to take the Parts separately, or quarterly to take the Volumes bound in boards, in a way exactly similar to that of the History.

For me to pretend to undertake, unassisted, a Work of this sort, which, to execute well, requires the pen of a person not only possessed of *great legal knowledge*, but also *well versed in the history of the law*, would be great presumption. Without such assistance the Work was not to be thought of for a moment; and, I am convinced, that the very first Part will satisfy the reader, that it has not been undertaken without means of every kind sufficient to carry it on to a conclusion, in a manner worthy of matter so generally interesting and highly important. In the publication of the History, I relied upon the sound sense of the public, rather than upon the prevailing literary taste of the times; and from the success of that Work, I am convinced that success will attend this also. I am convinced, that there are readers, and readers enough,

who wish to know, from authentic sources, what the *facts* of our history are; how our government *really* was administered heretofore; what sort of men our forefathers *really* were, and how they *really* acted; and who will not be satisfied with the vague notions which alone can be collected from historical magic lanterns, like that of Hume for instance, in which no one single object is plainly or distinctly presented to us, but where a multitude of images are made rapidly and confusedly to pass before our eyes, distorted and discoloured according to the taste of the showman.

Dec. 1, 1808. W. COBBETT.

* * * The First Part will be published on Monday the 2d of January, 1809; and as the number of copies of the succeeding parts must, of course, be regulated by the degree of success that can reasonably be counted upon, Subscribers are respectfully requested to send in their Names as early as possible.

The Work will be published by R. Bagshaw, Brydges Street, Covent-Garden; and will be sold by J. Budd, Pall-Mall; J. Faulder, New Bond Street; H. D. Symonds, Paternoster Row; Black, Parry, and Kingsbury, Leadenhall Street; J. Archer, Dublin; and by every Bookseller, Law-Stationer, and Newsman in the United Kingdom.

LORD ANSON

To the Freeholders of the County of Stafford.

Having taken an active part in the Requisition to the High Sheriff to call a Meeting of the County of Stafford, I am induced to trespass upon your patience, to state, as briefly as possible, my sentiments respecting some part of the proceedings which did actually take place at the Meeting. I entered my Protest against the form adopted by the High Sheriff for introducing the Requisition to public notice. The form was certainly unusual, I believe unprecedented, and a direct deviation on the part of the High Sheriff in his official capacity, from what I humbly conceived to be strictly his duty. I should be almost inclined to say that the calling together a Meeting of any County in a manner so novel, was ill-judged and ill-advised, inasmuch as it might be liable to the imputation of having been so proclaimed, for the express purpose of creating some difference of opinion, as well amongst the Requisitionists, as amongst the other Freeholders of the County, with the hopes, by such a manœuvre of marring the object of the Meeting, and thus checking, if possible, the ebullition of public spirit. Such having been my sentiments respecting

the manner in which the Requisition was announced, I now feel it my duty to enter my public protest against a Vote of Thanks to the High Sheriff, moved at the Meeting which did take place at Stafford; for, in direct opposition to the statement made in that motion, I do conceive that there was at least, much, and most notorious irregularity in the mode of convening that assembly. Under the same impressions it was judged right by many of my friends, not to give sanction to such a Requisition by their attendance on the day appointed by the Sheriff. In this, I felt myself obliged, though unwillingly, to concur, as my health would not allow of my personal appearance in the county—a circumstance which I cannot sufficiently deplore. For, most assuredly, had I been present at Stafford on the 11th inst. I would, at all events, have had the honour of proposing to you the intended Address or Petition to his Majesty, (a copy of which you have no doubt seen in the Staffordshire Advertiser); and notwithstanding it was a Convention of the County, not at all agreeing with my own ideas of regularity, should certainly have given my Brother Freeholders an opportunity of deciding upon the merits of the Address, which it would, under such circumstances, have fallen to my lot to propose, and the uncalled-for Resolutions, which, though they may probably speak the sentiments of some few of the most powerful interests in the county, I will venture to assert and maintain, are by no means declaratory of the real and general sense of the people, with respect to the terms of that most weak and disgraceful, though important Convention, upon which myself and many of my friends felt anxious to express our sentiments to his Majesty, in a manner the most loyal and constitutional. It may, I know, be urged, that his Majesty has been graciously pleased to institute an Inquiry. It is upon this point, that myself and my friends on the other side are at issue. His Majesty (as we are informed by the public prints) has indeed ordered a Military Court of Inquiry, and the adoption of such a mode of Inquiry may, at first view, appear to some persons to be all-sufficient. But I beg leave to ask, in case that Military Grand Jury should throw out the Bill, how, or from what quarter is the nation to look for an explanation either consolatory or satisfactory? And I very much doubt whether, in any point of view, such a Court will be competent to afford full and comprehensive satisfaction to the Country at large. It is upon these grounds that myself and friends were desirous of petitioning his Majesty to

convene his Parliament, for the purpose of instituting an Inquiry and Investigation before that Constitutional Tribunal. Parliament is said to be the voice of the People; by some persons it may be objected that it is not precisely so at this moment, and though the public expectations and anxious wish for truth, and nothing but the truth, might be disappointed equally, even by such a reference, yet the people at large would certainly have no right to complain, as they could only blame themselves for having elected such Representatives, as could sacrifice their Country's glory and honour, either from fear of avowing constitutional principles, or with a view of promoting their own private interest, or party spirit.—Having thus entered my decided protest against the Resolutions passed at the Meeting which did take place, I shall now say a word or two upon the Address intended to have been proposed, the object of which was, to request his Majesty to summon his Parliament, and to bring the discussion of the unfortunate Convention before that, the only Constitutional Court.—I earnestly request you to examine with attention the words of that Address. No attack is made upon the character of any set of men. No attempt is made to prejudice any Commander. No allusion is made to any individual.—I defy the most zealous or scrutinizing prerogative stickler, to point out any part of that Address, which is wanting either in loyalty, or attachment to the Sovereign. It is, on the contrary, couched in terms of the most proper respect towards his Majesty; at the same time, that, in temperate but dignified language, it asserts the right of the subject, and expresses boldly, that just sense of the disgrace, which has fallen upon the national character, by an event as unaccountable, as it was unexpected. The Address implies distinctly an imputation of blame somewhere, and solicits a Parliamentary Inquiry into the causes of an evil of such magnitude.—I shall now take my leave of you, with only requesting that you will compare carefully and without prejudice the intended Address, with those Resolutions, which were carried at the Meeting. Let every man appeal fairly to his own heart, whether the Address intended to have been proposed, is not more adapted to his own private sentiments, more consonant to the public opinion, and more congenial to the feelings of every Englishman, who professes an honest, though not parasitical loyalty to his King, and an attachment invincible to the laws and Constitution of his Country.—I entreat you to make this comparison in order to convince

yourselves, that the Address alluded to, breathes NO spirit, which is not most truly and strictly honourable to the feelings of subjects of a great empire, and that I may stand acquitted before my Brother Freeholders, of having been actuated by any other motives, than such as glow in the breast of every true and free-born Briton. I am proud of participating in such sentiments, and have the honour to be, "In this matter, "as in all others in which" not only "the "Independence and Honour of the County "of Stafford" but of "the Kingdom at "large, are concerned,"—Brother Freeholders,—Your devoted and faithful Servant,
—ANSON. Bath, Nov 15th, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

BUENOS AYRES.—*Proclamation by Don Santiago Liniers y Bremond, Viceroy, Governor, and Provincial Captain-General of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, &c. Dated Buenos Ayres, Aug. 15, 1808.*
(Concluded from p. 864.)

I communicate this by special couriers, to all the heads of provinces on this continent, that by adopting one uniform system, they may make the greater efforts to facilitate the succours necessary to preserve the glory acquired by a city, which from its local situation, and its energy, has been, and will continue to be, the impregnable bulwark of South America. But I cannot conclude without impressing upon you, and yourselves cannot but know it, that no force is comparable to union of opinion and feeling, nor any means more effective to preserve you invincible than reciprocal confidence between you and the constituted authorities, who, attentive only to the public interest and benefit, will see with dissatisfaction and abhorrence every thing that opposes or separates itself from the general prosperity.—SANTIAGO LINIERS.—*Buenos Ayres, Aug. 11, 1808.*

FRENCH EXPOSÉ.—*Paris, Nov. 3*—In the sitting of yesterday, his excellency the minister of the interior, accompanied by Messrs. de Segur and Corvetto, counselors of state, pronounced the following speech on the situation of the French empire:—Gentlemen, you terminated your last session, leaving the empire happy, and its chief loaded with glory. The year has passed away, and a multitude of new circumstances have added to the good fortune of the country, and increased our hopes of future benefits. All that I have to state to you, gentlemen, is already known to you; and, for your full information, I have only

to retrace to your memory the principal events which have filled up the interval between your last and your present session, and to recal to you the additional advantages for which France is indebted to the wisdom and valour of her sovereign. I will speak to you first of the wants of nations; justice, public instruction, the arts and sciences, the numerous branches of internal administration, public worship, the finances, and our principal relations with the states of the Continent. The recital will bring us of course to this lamentable war, which we maintain against one single people. The glory of our nation wounds that people, our strength alarms them; the independence of our commerce and our industry disquiets them; every thing is again subjected to the fortune of war; but the days of justice are not far distant.—[Here follows a long detail respecting the administration of justice, the principal amelioration of which consists in the establishment of the trial by jury, on the precise principles of the English law. The next head is that of public worship, which is followed by that of sciences and literature, public instruction, &c.—These articles being of great length, and less immediate importance, we reserve them for a future opportunity, and proceed to the heads which are most interesting to the English reader.]—Among the arts of industry which have made progress in the course of this year, we must enumerate the manufactory of tin. In two of our manufactories they have attained a degree of perfection, no ways yielding to that of the English. A premium of encouragement has been given accordingly; and another is also destined to ulterior efforts in the same branch.—The mechanics, in their endeavours of simplifying their looms, and introducing economy in their labours, have often also improved the quality of their stuffs. Those that are used in the weaving of cotton, have, for several years, been much multiplied; the spirit of invention has brought them to perfection. There is nothing now but what we can make, and very well. The weaving of the cotton has made as marked a progress as the spinning. These two kinds of industry are already adequate to the consumption of the empire, which is forever liberated of the grievous taxation it has hitherto been under to the Indian manufacturers and to their oppressors. The machines best calculated for the manufacture of cloths, are already in wide circulation; they have lately been much encouraged by advances made to different manufacturers in the departments.—The conservatory of arts and handicraft is daily

enriching by the requisition of new patterns, and is entitled to commendation for the information which the pupils receive, who frequent its school of drawing and descriptive geometry. Reforms have been made in the school at Chalons-sur-Marne.—The consultation chambers of the manufactures are hastening to present useful views, which will be taken advantage of. The institution of arbitrators, for the purpose of deciding with celerity variances that may arise between the workmen and their employers, render to industry services which have been set forth. Since your last session, gentlemen, several towns have demanded them, and there are already some established at Nimes, Aix-la-Chapelle, Avignon, Troies, Mulhausen, Sedan, and Thiers.

Commerce.—The political events have been unfavourable to commerce. It still was kept alive in the midst of the contentions that have deluged the Continent in blood, because those nations that were involved in the war preferred their neutrality—that right deemed, even in our times, inviolable. But the English legislation, already misled by the ambition of universal monopoly, has overthrown the ancient barrier of the law of nations, and trampled their independence under foot, substituting in the room of them a new maritime code. The ordinances of his Britannic majesty have realized these innovations: that of the 11th of November, 1807, is particularly remarkable; it pronounces, by an universal blockade, the interdiction of all our ports, in subjecting the ships of neutral powers, friendly and even allied to Great Britain, to the visitation of its cruisers, to be conducted to British ports, and there to be taxed by an arbitrary inquisition.—The emperor, obliged to oppose just reprisals to this strange legislation, gave out the decree of the 23d of November, ordaining the seizure and confiscation of the ships which, after having touched in England, should enter the ports of France.—From these measures, provoked by the British laws, the almost absolute cessation of the maritime relations, and many privations for the French merchants, manufacturers, and consumers, must have necessarily ensued. We all know with what resignation these privations were endured; we know that they are already become habitual, that they have awakened the genius of invention, and produced a thousand resources in substitution of the objects which we are in want of; we know, finally, that a great nation, essentially agricultural, can, by possessing in abundance all articles of utility, easily forego those, which only form certain luxuries

or conveniencies of life, particularly when its independence and glory should be put at stake.—These circumstances have favoured one of the greatest scourges of commerce, smuggling. But it has been strongly repressed. The government is preparing new means against this foe to the public revenue, and national industry; the great emoluments it procures excites the most ardent cupidity. Those, who ought not to be honoured with the approbation of merchants, lest we should degrade commerce, are still devoting themselves to criminal peculations; they think that they are only braving the shame of an ordinary transgression; but the public indignation and vengeance will overtake them, and teach them that under circumstances where the nation employs for its defence, in an unexampled war, the interdiction of all commercial relations with the enemy, the violation of these dispositions is an hostile declaration, a true alliance with this same enemy; that consequently every smuggler renounces the benefit of the municipal laws, to be subjected solely to those of war, and that he ought to dread the terrible and rapid application of those laws, which authorise the invasion of his fortune and personal castigation.—The government, penetrated with the situation of the French commerce, has strove to mitigate the evils, to provide for its wants.—Abroad, a treaty with the kingdom of Italy secures to France all the advantages which are compatible with the reciprocal justice. In the interior, various sums, which have been advanced to manufacturers and proprietors of produce, which public events had accumulated or cramped in their stores.—The *Caisse d'Armortissement* has interfered in the outfittings of adventurers.—A law has limited the bounds of the interest on money; offices established at Lyons and at Rouen are prelude to a grand system of facility in the circulation of the numerary and merchandize.—The exchange and the commercial tribunal of Paris see rising for their accommodation a stately palace, on the scite of the nunnery of St. Thomas.—Conformably to the new code, an organisation of the tribunals of commerce of the empire is preparing. The prefects, the courts of appeal have been consulted on the most eligible scites for these tribunals, as well as on the subject of their number, the judges and their surrogates. A general project has been submitted to the discussion of the council of state, and to the sanction of his majesty.

Agriculture.—The prefects, the courts of appeal, and of the members of the general

councils of department, formed in commission, are also called upon to give their advice on a project of the greatest utility, that of a rural code, so important to the prosperity of agriculture, and so closely interwoven with national prosperity.—In the meantime, one of the principal improvements of which agriculture is capable, is daily effected by the re-organization of our repositories for the breed of horses. Eight new repositories of stallions have been formed this year. Premiums held out to the owners of the best horses brought to the fairs, rewards decreed at the departmental races, are so many additional means of favouring the production of the most eligible species of this animal.—Two new sheep-farms have been introduced. Six hundred Merinos, of the best breed, have been ordered from Spain, and they are already arrived in France, notwithstanding the variety of obstacles that have occurred on their passage. They will be divided in two new establishments, as yet in embryo. The multiplication of the flocks increases rapidly, and we may consider the happy revolution introduced in this branch as completed.—May it one day be so also with the culture of cotton. In spite of the contrarieties of a hardy spring, and a tolerable cold autumn, the attempts made still give room to hope for ultimate success. We are justified to augur well also of the attempts made on the subject of the syrups of the grape. The rich culture of tobacco is daily extending; that which is gathered in the vicinity of St. Malo, equals in quality that of America. France will one day, to judge by appearances, not only supply its own wants with that production, but also export it to her neighbours.

The Public Treasure and Finances.—Regularity, and a judicious administration, prevail in every department of the public treasury.—The national accounts are reduced to a system the most scientific and luminous; it differs from the mode adopted by the most intelligent merchants, only in the extent and necessary complication of the transactions of government.—The finances have been gradually brought by the emperor, from a state of dilapidation and confusion, to a state of order and prosperity unknown in the governments the best administered. It is a trophy raised by vigorous exertion, by combinations the most judicious, and by a perseverance which has unravelled the most intricate details, and surmounted incredible difficulties. The nation enjoys the benefits which result from this new sort of conquest. Since France has generously consented to the adoption of indirect taxation, the finan-

ces have really been consolidated, and the utmost facility of carrying on the functions of every department of the public service.—The finances in modern times may be considered as the security of states, and the measure of their stability. If they furnish government only with inadequate, precarious, or oppressive resources, its energies become paralyzed, individuals insolvent, and if war, or any other calamity, should visit a nation under these circumstances, it must subscribe to its own dishonour, or be involved in irretrievable ruin.—The finances of a state are not essentially and efficiently good, until they become independent of circumstances—until they can be maintained independently of the ruinous expedient of resorting to loans and excessive contributions—until, in fine, they are so connected and identified with national prosperity, that they constitute a direct emanation from it; then only can they be deemed solid, efficient, permanent, and essentially national, and, particularly, if they have received an organization sufficiently simple; so that in an extraordinary emergency, all the property, and all the individuals may be called upon, promptly, to furnish their respective quotas in advance.—The endeavours of his majesty have been incessantly directed to the attainment of this desirable object, and they have been crowned by the most complete success, and the finances are calculated in future to meet with equal effect the exigencies of war and of peace.—In a period of peace, 600 millions will be sufficient to defray the public expences, and will leave a large surplus for national improvements. The receipts, which amount at the present moment to 800 millions, will, according to this arrangement, be reduced one-fourth.—In time of war, it is not in the contemplation of his imperial majesty to resort to the illusory expedients of imposing taxes of a novel description, or to hold out temptation to raise new supplies. The contributions on the recurrence of war will be brought back to the war standard—i. e. 800 millions, and even then raised only by 100 or 150 millions at a time, in case of need; and this will be done by a simple scale, or table of proportions, which will enable every citizen to judge of the share he has in the good or bad fortune of the state.—Observe, gentlemen, that this simplicity has no affinity or connection with that so considerably extolled as the result of a single direct contribution; it is, on the contrary, founded on a conviction that taxes ought to be laid on various objects, that our laws of finance include all the taxes which it was expedient to establish, and that all that is

just and reasonable has been effected.—It remains only to limit to the survey or register, without which the uniform progress of the scale of increase or diminution would be deficient, in proportion, and would continue to affect the proprietors of the funds actually surcharged; the making up of this register, which ought to efface so much inequality, to repair so much involuntary and inevitable injustice, is pursued with so much constancy, that those who disbelieve the practicability of this immense work, no longer doubt of its speedy execution. I must not here omit, gentlemen, the creation of the court of accounts, to the establishment of which you co-operated in your last session. We wanted a new institution, powerful in its unity, present to all the depositaries of the public property by the rapidity of its action, embracing all the responsibility of inferior accountants connected with the public income and expenditure. This court ought, by the distribution of its duties, and the number of its members, to be adequate to all the occasions, and responsible for all the labours, that may be entrusted to it. The principles on which this establishment rests, the choice of its members, the consideration in which they are held, every thing guarantees the success the government has promised itself, that of a salutary controul over the several accountants.

Administration of the War Department.

—The same principles of order, and the same views for the acceleration of the service, have influenced the general direction of the commissariat, whose first essays justify the expectation that had been formed. This administration renders the supplies of the army independent of contractors, who have so frequently done injury, at the same time that it secures the advantage of our economy, very sensible to the public funds.

Marine.—Though during the present campaign the government has limited its maritime operations, still a squadron armed at Toulon, as if by enchantment, and conducted with skill, has been able to defeat, by able manœuvres, the combinations of the enemy, by conveying to Corfu two years supplies of men, artillery, provisions, and ammunition. After having thus rendered useless the expedition with which that barrier of the Adriatic was threatened, the fleet of Admiral Gantheaume returned safe through all the difficulties of a boisterous navigation, and all the dangers of continued tempests. The colonies have in like manner been successfully supplied with provisions, by squadrons of frigates and corvettes, which, while they fulfilled that important object, had,

like the squadron, that went to Corfu, the advantage of making prizes of a great number of the enemy's ships, richly laden. In India, prizes to the value of 15 millions have been the result of the cruises of our frigates, one of which only surrendered, and that after a glorious contest, against a superior force.—Our cruisers, in all parts of the world, and above all in the seas of India and Guadaloupe, have proved themselves formidable to the enemy. But it is not so much with a view to what it has done, but to what it may do with time, that our marine ought to be considered. Ten ships of the line, constructed in the docks of Antwerp, and fitted for sea many months since, are awaiting their destination. The flotilla of Boulogne, kept up and equipped, is still in readiness to undertake the operations for which it was originally created.—Twelve ships of the line, and as many frigates, have been launched within the year, and twenty-five more, and as many frigates on the stocks, attest the activity of our dock-yards. Our ports are preserved in perfect order, and the creation of that of Cherbourg is so far advanced, that its basin may be expected to be in a state to contain squadrons before the lapse of two campaigns.—Spezzia is about to become a second Toulon. The union of almost all the coast of the Mediterranean to France, secures to our arsenals and our ships, abundant supplies of provisions, stores, and men. Venice, Ancona, Naples, and all the means of Holland and Italy, are in motion.

The Present War.—At the epoch of your last sitting, gentlemen, every thing combined to deliver Europe from its long agitations; but England, the enemy of the world, still repeated the cry of perpetual war, and war continues. What then is the object—what will be the issue? The object of this war is the slavery of the world, by the exclusive possession of the seas. There is no doubt, that, by subscribing treaties of bondage, disguised under the holy name of peace, nations may obtain repose; but this shameful repose would be death. In this alternative, the choice between submission and resistance could not be long doubtful.—The war which England has provoked, which she continues with so much pride and obstinacy, is the termination of the ambitious system which she has cherished during two centuries. Mixing in the politics of the continent, she has succeeded in holding Europe in a perpetual agitation, and in exciting against France all the envious and jealous passions. It was her wish to humble or destroy France, by keeping the people of the

continent constantly under arms; but thus detaching the maritime powers, she had the art to profit from the divisions she fomented among neighbours, in order to forward her distant conquests.—In this manner she extended her colonies, and augmented her naval power; and, by the aid of that power, she hopes henceforth to enjoy her usurpation, and to arrogate to herself the exclusive possession of the seas.—But until these latter times, she paid at least some respect to the laws of nations; she seemed to respect the rights of her allies, and even, by some returns towards peace, allowed her enemies to breathe.—This conduct is, however, no longer suitable to the developement of a system which she can no longer dissemble. All who do not promote her interests are her enemies. The abandonment of her alliance is a cause of war; neutrality is a revolt; and all the nations that resist her yoke are made subject to her cruel ravages.—It is impossible to foresee what might have been the consequence of so much audacity, had not fortune, on our part, raised up a man of a superior order, destined to repel the evils with which England threatens the world.—He had also to combat the allies of that power on the continent, and to conquer the rising enemies she succeeded in creating. Always attacked, always threatened, he found it necessary to regulate his policy by that state of things, and felt that to lay the contest it was necessary to augment our forces, and weaken those of our enemies.—The emperor always pacific, but always armed by necessity, was not ambitious of aggrandizing the empire. Prudence always directed his views. It became necessary for him to relieve our ancient frontiers from the too near danger of sudden attacks, and to found their security on limits fortified by nature; finally, it became necessary so to separate France, by alliances from her rivals, that even the sight of an enemy's standard never could alarm the territory of the empire.—England, defeated in the disputes she so often renewed, profited however, of them to increase her wealth, by the universal monopoly of commerce.—She had impoverished her allies by wars, in which they fought only for her interests. Abandoned at the moment in which their arms ceased to serve those interests, their fate became the more indifferent to her as she preserved some commercial relations with them, even while she continued at war with France.—Even France herself left to the English the hope of a shameful subjugation to the want of certain objects, the privation of which they believe our generous population could not support. They thought that

if they could not enter the territory of the empire by their arms, they might penetrate its heart by a commerce now become its most dangerous enemy, and the admission of which would have exhausted its most valuable resources.—The genius and the prudence of the emperor have not overlooked this danger. Involved in the difficulties of the continental war, he ceased not, however, to repel from his states the monopoly of English commerce: He has since completed the measures of an effectual resistance.—No one can now be deceived on this subject, since the English have declared this new kind of war, all the ports of the continent are blockaded, the ocean is interdicted to every neutral ship which will not pay to the British treasury a tribute which is meant to be imposed on the whole population of the globe.—To this law of slavery other nations have replied by means of a reprisal and by wishes for the annihilation of such a tyranny.—The English nation has separated itself from every other nation. England is fixed in this situation. All her social relations with the continent are suspended. She is smitten by the excommunication which she has herself provoked.—The war will henceforth consist in repelling from all points the English commerce, and in employing all the means calculated to promote that end. France has energetically concurred in the exclusion of the monopoly of commerce; she has resigned herself to privations which long habits must have rendered more painful. Some branches of her agriculture and her industry have suffered, and still suffer, but the prosperity of the great body of the nation is not affected: she is familiarised with that transitory state, the hardship of which she beholds without fear. The allies of France, and the United States, sacrifice like her, and with a resolution equally generous, their private conveniences. England was on the eve of the moment when her exclusion from the continent was about to be consummated: but she availed herself of the last circumstance to spread the genius of evil over Spain, and to excite in that unhappy country all the rage of furious passions. She has sought for alliances even in support of the inquisition, and even in the most barbarous prejudices. Unhappy people, to whom do you confide your destiny? To the contemners of all moral obligations—to the enemies of your religion—to those who, violating their promises, have elevated on your territory a monument of their impudence, an

affront, the impunity of which, for above a century, would bear testimony against your courage, if the weakness of your government had not been alone to blame. You ally yourself with the English, who have so often wounded your pride and your independence, who have so long ravished from you, by open violence, and even in time of peace, the commerce of your colonies; who, in order to intimate to you their prohibition of your neutrality, caused their decrees to be preceded by the plunder of your treasures, and the massacre of your navigators; who, in fine, have covered Europe with proofs of their contempt for their allies, and for the deceitful promises they had made to them. You will without doubt recover from your error. You will then groan for the new perfidies that are reserved for you. But how much blood will flow before this tardy return to your senses? The English, hitherto absent from all great conflicts, try a new fortune on the continent. They ungarrison their island, and leave it almost without defence, in the presence of an enterprising and valiant king, who commands a French army, and who has already snatched from them the strong position of the island of Caprea. What then will be the fruit of their efforts? Can they hope to be able to exclude the French from Spain and Portugal? Can the success be doubtful? The emperor himself will command his invincible legions. What a presage does the heroic army of Portugal offer to us, which, struggling against double its force, has been able to raise trophies of victory on the very land where it fought to such disadvantage, and to dictate the conditions of a glorious retreat? In preparing for a new struggle against our only enemy, the emperor has done all that was necessary for the maintenance of peace on the continent. He must reckon upon it without doubt, inasmuch as Austria, the only power which could disturb it, has given the strongest assurances of her disposition, in recalling her ambassador from London, and desisting from all political communication with England.—Still Austria had recently made armaments, but they took place certainly without any hostile intention. Prudence, nevertheless, dictated energetic measures of precaution. The armies of Germany and Italy are strengthened by levies of the new conscription. The troops of the confederation of the Rhine are complete, well organized, and disciplined.

(*To be continued.*)